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The Monetary Policy Debate Since October 1979:
Lessons for Theory and Practice
Marvin Goodfriend 
from evidence accumulated in the conquest of
inflation. Monetarist theory and evidence on
money supply and demand, and on the relation-
ship between money and inflation, encouraged
the Volcker Fed to act against inflation. The suc-
cessful stabilization and eventual elimination of
inflation at reasonable cost in light of subsequent
benefits, without wage and price controls, and
without supportive fiscal policy actions, vindi-
cated the main monetarist message. However, the
Fed’s reliance on interest rate policy since then
appears to contradict monetarist teaching that
money must play a central role in the execution
of monetary policy. Modern models of interest
rate policy owe more to post-monetarist rational
expectations reasoning and notions of credibility
and commitment to policy rules born of the
rational expectations revolution.
Much macroeconomic theory developed
before October 1979 remains at the core of models
of monetary policy in use today. The notion of a
permanent trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment has been discredited. However, the
forward-looking theory of consumption and
1 INTRODUCTION
I
n retrospect, the Federal Reserve tightening
of monetary policy begun under the leader-
ship of Paul Volcker in October 1979 stands
as a decisive turning point in the postwar mone-
tary history of the United States. With some ups
and downs, inflation rose from around 1 percent
to over 10 percent in the preceding two decades.
The Volcker Fed brought inflation down to
around 4 percent by 1984 after a difficult period
of sustained disinflationary monetary policy. In
the two decades since, inflation has been reduced
to a range in 2003 that Chairman Greenspan
characterized as “effective price stability,” thanks
to the consistent inflation-fighting actions of the
Greenspan Fed.
The Volcker disinflation and the stabilization
of inflation has had an enormous influence on the
theory and practice of monetary policy.1 This
paper reviews how monetary policy has been
shaped by that experience. A large part of the
story is that central bankers and academic econ-
omists learned from each other and both learned
1 See, for instance, Blinder (2004) and Fischer (1994).
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Monetary theory and policy have been revolutionized in the two decades since October 1979,
when the Federal Reserve under the leadership of Paul Volcker moved to stabilize inflation and
bring it down. On the side of practice, the decisive factor was the demonstration that monetary
policy could acquire and maintain credibility for low inflation, and improve the stability of both
inflation and output relative to potential. On the theory side, the introduction of rational expec-
tations was decisive because it enabled models of monetary policy to incorporate forward-looking
elements of aggregate demand and price-setting, long known to be critically important for policy
analysis, so as to understand how monetary policy achieved the favorable results found in practice. 
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 investment developed decades ago remains at the
core of the modern theory of aggregate demand.
And Keynesian dynamic rational expectations
sticky-price models of monetary policy pioneered
in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Guillermo
Calvo, Stanley Fischer, and John Taylor remain
at the core of models of aggregate supply today.
Keynesian models predict an inverse relationship
between the change in inflation and the output
gap. That view was confirmed by the severe reces-
sion accompanying the Volcker disinflation. Since
then, the success in stabilizing inflation has given
credence in practice to the rational expectations
idea that a central bank committed to making low
inflation a priority can anchor inflation expecta-
tions and improve the stability of both inflation
and output relative to potential.
Section 2 sets the stage for the discussion to
follow by reviewing the practice and theory of
monetary policy as of October 1979. Section 3
describes the key empirical features of the Volcker
disinflation and the lessons that they teach.
Section 4 summarizes current consensus views
on the theory and practice of monetary policy that
emerged from the disinflation experience and
related theoretical developments. Topics covered
are as follows: the consensus theoretical model
of monetary policy, implicit inflation targeting
in practice, explicit interest rate policy, and
communication policy. In Section 5 we consider
current controversies related to each aspect of
monetary theory and practice discussed in
Section 4. 
2 EXPERIENCE AND THEORY AS
OF OCTOBER 1979
The Volcker Fed was encouraged to embark
on a disinflationary course by a practical appre-
ciation of the problems in failing to make low
inflation a priority, and by a theoretical under-
standing that inflation should and could be sta-
bilized and brought down with monetary policy.
This section describes the destabilizing go-stop
policy cycles that characterized inflationary mone-
tary policy prior to 1979 and summarizes briefly
Keynesian and monetarist thinking as it related
to the promise and prospects for the stabilization
of inflation as of 1979.
2.1 Inflationary Go-Stop Monetary
Policy Prior to 1979
A combination of factors explains the unprece-
dented peacetime inflation that tripled the general
price level in the two decades prior to the Volcker
disinflation.2 Most important was the willingness
to tolerate each burst of inflation in the expecta-
tion that it would soon die down. In retrospect,
the public’s willingness to accept the upward drift
of the price level after World War II was probably
the origin of the loss of credibility for low infla-
tion that eventually helped to unhinge inflation
expectations in the 1960s and thereafter. There
was little understanding at first of the role played
by inflation expectations in propagating wage
and price inflation and the scope for monetary
policy to anchor inflation expectations. Finally,
the idea that inflation could permanently reduce
unemployment, which gained currency in the
1960s, appeared to provide a benefit to some
inflation.
When one adds to the above inclinations and
beliefs that the Fed was charged with conducting
monetary policy on a discretionary basis, one
can understand the go-stop monetary policy that
characterized the decades prior to October 1979.
During that period the Fed tended to justify peri-
odic actions to contain inflation against an implicit
objective for low unemployment. Inflation would
rise slowly as monetary policy stimulated employ-
ment in the go phase of the policy cycle. By the
time the public and Fed became sufficiently con-
cerned about rising inflation for monetary policy
to act against it, pricing decisions had already
begun to embody higher inflation expectations.
At that point, a given degree of restraint on infla-
tion required a more aggressive increase in short-
term interest rates, with greater risk of recession.
There was a relatively narrow window of broad
public support for the Fed to tighten monetary
policy in the stop phase of the policy cycle. The
window opened after rising inflation was recog-
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2 See, for instance, Hetzel (1998) and Orphanides (2002).nized as the major concern and closed when
tighter monetary policy caused the unemployment
rate to begin to rise. Often the Fed did not take
full advantage of the window of opportunity to
raise rates because it wanted more confirmation
that higher rates were called for and it was con-
cerned about the recessionary consequences.
Once the unemployment rate peaked and began to
fall, however, the public’s anxiety about it dimin-
ished. And the Fed could fight inflation less visi-
bly by lowering interest rates gradually and
prolonging the stop phase of the policy cycle.3
The tolerance for rising inflation and the
sensitivity to recession meant that go-stop cycles
became more inflationary over time. The average
unemployment rate rose, too, perhaps because
increasingly restrictive monetary policy was
needed on average to prevent inflation from rising
still faster. Aggressive price- and wage-setting
behavior tended to neutralize the favorable
employment effects of monetary stimulus in the
go phase of the policy cycles. As the Fed attempted
to offset these unfavorable developments, infla-
tion and expected inflation moved higher. Lenders
demanded unprecedented inflation premia in
long-term bond rates, and the absence of an anchor
for inflation caused inflation expectations and
long bond rates to fluctuate widely.
2.2 The Theory of Monetary Policy as
of October 1979
James Tobin’s (1980) comprehensive review of
stabilization policy written for the 10th anniver-
sary of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
contains a good summary of macroeconomic
theory as it related to monetary policy, unemploy-
ment, and inflation at the time. The five main
points of what he calls the consensus macroecon-
omic framework, vintage 1970, are as follows4:
(1) Prices are marked up labor costs, usually
adjusted to normal operating rates and
productivity trends…and rates of price
and wage increase depend partly on their
recent trends, partly on expectations of
their future movements, and partly on the
tightness of markets for products and labor.
(2) Variations in aggregate demand, whether a
consequence of policies or of other events,
affect the course of prices and output, and
wages and employment, by altering the
tightness of labor and product markets, and
in no other way.
(3) The tightness of markets can be related to
the utilization of productive resources,
reported or adjusted unemployment rates,
and capacity operating rates. At any given
utilization rate, real output grows at a steady
pace…reflecting trends in supplies of labor
and capital and in productivity. According
to Okun’s law, in cyclical fluctuations each
percentage point of unemployment corre-
sponds to 3 percent of GDP [gross domestic
product].
(4) Inflation accelerates at high employment
rates because tight markets systematically
and repeatedly generate wage and price
increases in addition to those already incor-
porated in expectations and historical pat-
terns. At low utilization rates, inflation
decelerates, but probably at an asymmet-
rically slow pace. At the Phelps-Friedman
“natural rate of unemployment,” the
degrees of resource utilization generate no
net wage and price pressures up or down
and are consistent with accustomed and
expected paths, whether stable prices or
any other inflation rate. The consensus view
accepted the notion of a nonaccelerating
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)
as a practical constraint on policy, even
though some of its adherents would not
identify NAIRU as full, equilibrium, or
optimum employment.
(5) On the instruments of demand management
themselves, there was less consensus. The
monetarist counterrevolution had provided
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3 Friedman (1964) discusses go-stop monetary policy. Also, see
Goodfriend (1997) and Shapiro (1994). Taylor (1979) provides
quantitative evidence that can be interpreted as inefficient go-stop
policy. See, especially, his Figure 1. Romer and Romer (1989) docu-
ment that since World War II the Fed tightened monetary policy
decisively to contain inflation on six occasions: October 1947,
September 1955, December 1968, April 1974, August 1978, and
October 1979. The unemployment rate rose sharply each time.
4 The five points are taken from Tobin (1980, pp. 23-25).debate over the efficacy of monetary and
fiscal measures, the process of the transmis-
sion of monetary policies to total spending,
and the proper indicators and targets of
monetary policy. 
Remarkably, much of this consensus remains
at the core of modern mainstream models of mone-
tary policy today, as discussed in Section 4. 
Tobin was more pessimistic than other
Keynesian economists, such as Arthur Okun
(1978), that disinflationary monetary policy alone
could bring down inflation at an acceptable unem-
ployment cost. Tobin’s views are worth recalling
because they capture the more pessimistic
Keynesian thinking about the power of monetary
policy to control inflation, and they provide some
contrast with more optimistic monetarist views
discussed below that gained currency in the
inflationary decades prior to October 1979. For
instance, in the same paper, we learn that Tobin
thought that the path of real variables would have
been disastrously worse had the path of nominal
GDP growth been held to 4 percent per year since
1960. He regarded “the inertia of inflation in the
face of nonaccommodative policies [as] the big
issue.” Tobin’s view was that “the price- and wage-
setting institutions of the economy have an infla-
tion bias. Consequently, demand management
cannot stabilize the price trend without chronic
sacrifice of output and employment unless it is
assisted, occasionally or permanently, by direct
incomes policies of some kind.”5 A few pages later
Tobin says that he thinks it would be “recklessly
imprudent to lock the economy into a monetary
disinflation without auxiliary incomes policies.”6
Monetarists led by Milton Friedman, Karl
Brunner, and Allan Meltzer were optimistic that
the Fed could and should use monetary policy
alone to bring inflation down. Monetarist theory
and its prescriptions for monetary policy were
based on the quantity theory of money, evidence
from many countries showing that sustained infla-
tion was associated with excessive money growth,
and evidence that inflation could be stopped by
slowing the growth of the money supply.7
In particular, monetarists demonstrated con-
vincingly that the demand for money was suffi-
ciently stable in the United States to enable the
central bank to bring the inflation rate down by
reducing the trend rate of growth of the monetary
aggregates. And monetarists argued successfully
that, although the introduction of money substi-
tutes could adversely impact the stability of
money demand in the short run, money demand
was sufficiently stable and money supply suffi-
ciently controllable by a central bank over time
that financial innovations did not fundamentally
alter the central bank’s power over inflation. By
assembling a convincing body of theory and evi-
dence that controlling money was necessary and
sufficient for controlling inflation, and that a
central bank could control money, monetarists
laid the groundwork for the Volcker Fed to take
responsibility for inflation after October 1979 and
bring it down.
Monetarists, however, like Keynesians,
believed that a disinflation would be costly.
Previous experience with go-stop policy made it
clear that there was a short-run unemployment
cost of fighting inflation. The temporary unem-
ployment cost of a large permanent disinflation
would likely exceed the cost of previous tempo-
rary attempts to contain inflation in the stop phase
of the policy cycle. Both Keynesians and mone-
tarists then understood that the unemployment
cost of permanent disinflation could be reduced
greatly if the Fed could acquire credibility for low
inflation.8 In a credible disinflation, money growth
and inflation would slow together, with little
increase in unemployment.9
On the other hand, if the disinflation were not
credible, then wage and price inflation would
Goodfriend
246 MARCH/APRIL, PART 2 2005 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
5 Tobin (1980, p. 64).
6 Tobin (1980, p. 69).
7 See, for example, Friedman (1968, 1989), Meltzer (1963), Poole
(1978), Sargent (1986), and the regular reports of the Shadow Open
Market Committee led by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer.
8 Fellner (1979), Sargent (1986), and Taylor (1982) contain early
discussions of the role of credibility in minimizing the cost of
disinflation.
9 In fact, Ball (1994) pointed out that a fully credible disinflation
could produce a temporary increase in employment for some sticky
price specifications.continue as before, and the public would drive
interest rates up and asset prices down as it com-
peted for increasingly scarce real money balances.
In that case, unemployment would rise and come
down only as the disinflation gained credibility,
wage and price inflation slowed, interest rates
fell, asset prices rose, and aggregate demand
rebounded. 
Monetarists tended to be more optimistic than
Keynesians about the potential role for credibility
because monetarists saw a greater role for expec-
tations in wage and price setting and a smaller role
for inertia. And monetarists thought that mone-
tary policy could exert a greater influence over
expected inflation than did Keynesians. At any
rate, in October 1979 it was not at all clear how
quickly the Volcker Fed could acquire credibility
for low inflation, how costly a disinflation might
be, or even whether it could succeed at all, given
the pressure that would be brought to bear on the
Fed as a result of the accompanying recession.
3 LESSONS FROM THE VOLCKER
DISINFLATION
By October 1979 the level and volatility of
inflation and inflation expectations resulting from
two decades of inflationary go-stop monetary
policy greatly complicated the pursuit of stabiliza-
tion policy. Large real interest rate policy actions
were necessary to stabilize the economy. More-
over, it became increasingly difficult to track the
public’s inflation expectations to tell how nominal
federal funds rate policy actions translated into
real rate actions. The public found it increasingly
difficult to discern the Fed’s policy intentions,
and the Fed found it increasingly difficult to gauge
the state of the economy and how the economy
would respond to its policy actions. The oppor-
tunity for policy mistakes was enlarged. In short,
there was a breakdown in mutual understanding
between the public and the Fed. 
The Fed rarely sought publicity for its mone-
tary policy actions. However, confidence had
deteriorated to such an extent by October 1979
that the Fed broke sharply with tradition and
grabbed the headlines with a dramatic high-profile
announcement that it had changed operating pro-
cedures to place greater emphasis on controlling
money.10 That dramatic announcement served
three main purposes: (i) it associated the Fed with
monetarists and thereby bought some credibility
against inflation, (ii) it enabled the Fed to blame
high interest rates on tighter monetary control, and
(iii) it signaled that the Fed would take responsi-
bility for inflation and staked the Volcker Fed’s
reputation on containing inflation in order to
build the Fed’s credibility as an inflation fighter.
Importantly, the Volcker Fed did not talk much
about disinflation in October 1979. Its public
statements and Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) transcripts from the fall of 1979 make
clear that its objective was more modest: to stabi-
lize and contain an increase in inflation and
inflation expectations. A reading of the FOMC
transcripts also makes clear that the Fed came to
regard disinflation as a feasible and preferable
course of action only gradually as events
unfolded in 1980 and 1981. What follows is a
brief summary of the key aspects of the Volcker
disinflaton and their lessons for monetary policy.
In reviewing these events we will see why and
how the Volcker Fed produced the sustained
disinflation.
3.1 Loss of Room to Maneuver
The big surprise for the Volcker Fed in the
months after October 1979 was that its room to
maneuver between fighting inflation and fighting
recession disappeared.11 In effect, the Fed lost the
leeway to choose between stimulating employ-
ment in the go phase of the policy cycle and fight-
ing inflation in the stop phase. The Volcker Fed
raised the nominal federal funds rate by about 3
percentage points in the fall of 1979 in its open-
ing fight against inflation. But evidence that the
economy was moving into recession caused the
Fed to pause in its aggressive tightening. January
1980 later turned out to be a National Bureau of
Economic Research business cycle peak, validating
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11 See, for instance, FOMC (1980; Report on Open Market Operations,
February 4-5, pp. 3-4; and Joseph F. Ziesel, Chart Show, 
February 5).the Fed’s concern about a recession. But with the
federal funds rate held steady, the 30-year (long)
bond rate jumped by around 2 percentage points
between December and February, despite a weak-
ening economy. A number of factors contributed
to the unprecedented collapse of bond prices and
increase in inflation expectations evident in the
sharp rise in the bond rate. Among the most
important were the spike in inflation in early 1980,
the ongoing increase in oil prices, the incredible
rise in the price of gold to around $850 per ounce
in January, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
That said, the Fed’s hesitation to tighten policy
at the first sign of recession probably contributed
to the inflation scare by creating doubts in the
public’s mind of the Fed’s willingness to incur
the unemployment cost to contain inflation.
The unprecedented challenge to its credibility
as an inflation fighter made clear that the Fed had
lost the flexibility to use interest rate policy to
stabilize employment and output. The Fed reacted
aggressively to the inflation scare by raising the
federal funds rate 3 percentage points to 17 per-
cent in March! The short recession that occurred
in the first half of 1980 resulted from the tighten-
ing of monetary policy in conjunction with the
imposition of credit controls.12 When the magni-
tude of the downturn became clear, however, the
Fed cut the federal funds rate by around 8 per-
centage points between April and July to act
against it. Real GDP fell anyway, at around a 10
percent annual rate in the second quarter. But
the recession ended quickly with the aggressive
easing of monetary policy and the lifting of credit
controls in June, and real GDP bounced back with
8 percent annual growth in the fourth quarter of
1980. Unfortunately, inflation remained high
throughout 1980. 
3.2 Tactics, Credibility, and Cost
Observing the resurgence of economic activity,
the Fed quickly moved the federal funds rate back
up by early 1981 to 19 percent. As measured by
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) infla-
tion, which was around 10 percent at the time,
real short-term interest rates were then a very high
9 percent. A recession began in July 1981 that
would take the unemployment rate from around
7 percent to nearly 10 percent at the recession
trough in November 1982. PCE inflation fell by
around 5 percentage points to the 5 percent range
by the first quarter of 1982, and the Fed brought
the funds rate down by 5 percentage points as
well. Thus, the Fed maintained real short-term
interest rates of 9 percent, even as the unemploy-
ment rate continued to rise. One reason that policy
remained extraordinarily tight even after the break
in inflation is that the behavior of long bond rates
suggested that the Fed’s credibility as an inflation
fighter continued to deteriorate.13 The long rate
actually rose by 3 percentage points from January
1981 to more than 14 percent in October, even
as the economy weakened. And the bond rate
remained in the 13 to 14 percent range until it
began to come down in the summer of 1982. Only
then, in the third quarter of 1982, did the Fed
begin to reduce real short-term interest rates and
pave the way for a recovery. Thereafter, inflation
stabilized at around 4 percent and real GDP grew
by around 6.5 percent and 4.5 percent in 1983
and 1984, respectively.
A number of factors help to explain why the
Fed went ahead with the disinflation in 1981 and
why the disinflation succeeded. First, the disas-
trous developments in 1980 taught the Fed that
attempting to stabilize inflation at a high level
was costly for the following reasons14: (i) High
inflation invited inflation scares that the Fed was
compelled to counteract by raising short-term
real interest rates, with great risk of recession;
(ii) high inflation invited interventions, such as
credit controls, that could be equally damaging
to the economy; and (iii) containing inflation at
a high level would likely require the Fed to main-
tain a larger average output gap than otherwise
to prevent inflation from rising further.
Second, the events of 1980 heightened the
public’s unhappiness with high inflation. Public
Goodfriend
248 MARCH/APRIL, PART 2 2005 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
12 See Schreft (1990).
13 A reading of the 1981 transcripts reveals the FOMC’s concern with
high long-term interest rates and the high inflation expectations
that they reflect. For instance, see Chairman Volcker’s remarks on
page 39 of the August 18, 1981, transcript.
14 For instance, see Chairman Volcker’s remarks in the FOMC transcript
from July 7, 1981, p. 36.support, together with the support of the new
Reagan administration, encouraged the Volcker
Fed to pursue disinflationary monetary policy in
1981.
Third, the Fed did the hard work of raising
the federal funds rate to 17 percent in the spring
of 1980. The Fed then took advantage of the win-
dow of opportunity that presented itself during
the rebound in economic activity in the second
half of 1980 to return the federal funds rate to that
range. Moving the federal funds rate back up
aggressively signaled the Fed’s commitment and
determination to renew the fight against inflation
in 1981. By positioning itself with a 19 percent
nominal, and 9 percent real, federal funds rate,
the Fed could then let the economy disinflate
without having to raise the nominal funds rate
further and could lower the nominal federal funds
rate as the disinflation took hold. 
3.3 The Inflation Scare Problem and
Preemptive Interest Rate Policy
Severe credibility problems flared up during
the Volcker era as “inflation scares” in the bond
market—falling bond prices due to sharply rising
inflation premia in long-term interest rates.15
Inflation scares presented the Fed with a costly
dilemma: Ignoring them could encourage more
skepticism about the Fed’s fight against inflation,
but raising real short rates in response risked pre-
cipitating a recession or worsening a recession
already in progress. There were four prominent
inflation scares in the Volcker era. As discussed
above, the first scare in early 1980 shocked the Fed
into a 3-percentage-point tightening of the federal
funds rate in March and was pivotal in persuading
the Fed to pursue a more explicitly disinflationary
course. The second scare in 1981, with bond rates
remaining high through mid-1982, contributed
to the Fed’s prolonging the 1981-82 recession.
The third inflation scare took the long-term
rate from the 10 percent range in mid-1983 to over
13 percent in the summer of 1984. Remarkably,
the bond rate was then only about 1 percentage
point below its peak in 1981 even though inflation
was about 6 percentage points lower in 1984 and
inflation remained in the 4 percent range through-
out the inflation scare of 1983-84! In this case, the
Fed followed the long rate up with the federal
funds rate, taking the funds rate up by around 3
percentage points to the 11 percent range in mid-
1984 before the bond rate began to come down.
The bond rate then fell by 6 percentage points to
the 7 percent range by early 1986, about 3 per-
centage points below where it had been at the
start of the inflation scare. The Fed’s aggressive
containment of the scare apparently made the
public confident of another 3-percentage-point
reduction in the trend rate of inflation. 
The successful containment of the 1983-84
inflation scare was the most remarkable feature
of the Volcker disinflation. The Fed had succeeded
in reducing inflation temporarily in many pre-
ceding go-stop policy cycles.16 Preemptive interest
rate policy actions in 1983-84 finally put an end
to inflationary go-stop policy. This success was
particularly important for the future because it
showed that well-timed, aggressive interest rate
policy actions could defuse an inflation scare
and preempt rising inflation without creating a
recession.
The Volcker Fed was confronted with a fourth
inflation scare in 1987, the last year of Chairman
Volcker’s leadership of the Fed. The 1987 scare
was marked by a 2-percentage-point rise in the
bond rate between March and October. This time
the Volcker Fed reacted little to the scare, perhaps
because GDP growth was weaker than in 1983-84
and there was less risk of an increase in the actual
inflation rate. In light of the Volcker Fed’s demon-
strated determination to act against inflation ear-
lier in the decade, however, the 1987 scare was
striking evidence of the fragility of the credibility
of the Fed’s commitment to low inflation.
4 CONSENSUS THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF MONETARY POLICY
The period since October 1979 has seen a
considerable convergence in the theory and prac-
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Ireland (1996), and Orphanides and Williams (2005).tice of monetary policy. On the theory side, New
Neoclassical Synthesis models (alternatively
called New Keynesian models) of monetary policy
embody key components from Keynesian, mone-
tarist, rational expectations, and real business
cycle macroeconomics. On the policy side, it is
widely agreed that central banks can and should
use monetary policy to maintain low inflation
over time and that the commitment to price sta-
bility enhances the power of monetary policy to
stabilize employment over the business cycle.
The agreed-upon desirability and feasibility of a
priority for price stability was born of the practi-
cal experience reviewed above in conjunction
with theory developed since October 1979.
In what follows, we review the nature and
origin of key elements of the current consensus.
First, we review the components of the consensus
theory of monetary policy. Second, we review the
reasons for the rise of implicit inflation targeting
as the strategy of monetary policy in practice.
Third, we explain the emergence of explicit
interest rate policy as the means of implement-
ing, discussing, and analyzing monetary policy.
Fourth, we discuss the transition from the practice
of secrecy to transparency in communicating
monetary policy actions, concerns, and intentions
to the public.
4.1 The Consensus Model
The modern New Neoclassical Synthesis 
(or New Keynesian) consensus macroeconomic
model of monetary policy is a dynamic general
equilibrium model with a real business cycle
core and costly nominal price adjustment. The
consensus model and its implications for mone-
tary policy have been exposited from somewhat
different perspectives in Goodfriend and King
(1997), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Woodford
(2003), and Goodfriend (2004).17 A convergence
in thinking is clear from a reading of these diverse
expositions. The heart of the baseline model is
compactly represented by the following two
equations.
There is a “forward-looking IS function” in
which current aggregate demand relative to poten-
tial output depends positively on expected future
income and negatively on the short-term real
interest rate. It resembles the original Keynesian
IS function except for its reliance on expected
future income. The dependence of current aggre-
gate demand on expected future income dates
back to the theory of consumption developed by
Fisher (1930) and Friedman (1957). 
There is an “aggregate supply function,” also
called a price-setting function, that relates current
inflation inversely to the current markup (or out-
put gap) and expected future inflation. This aggre-
gate supply function can be derived directly from
Calvo’s (1983) model of staggered price setting
and is closely related to the pioneering work of
Stanley Fischer and John Taylor (see Taylor,
1999b).
The modeling of expected future income in
the IS function and expected future inflation in
the aggregate supply function reflects the intro-
duction of rational expectations into macroeco-
nomics by Robert Lucas in the 1970s.18 Rational
expectations theory and solution methods pro-
vided a convincing and manageable way to model
expectations. Moreover, rational expectations
theory taught that it is critically important in
analyzing monetary policy to let expectations
rationally reflect changes in the way that monetary
policy is imagined to be conducted. 
By solving the IS function forward, it is possi-
ble to express current aggregate demand relative
to potential in terms of the expected path of future
short-term real interest rates and future potential
output. To the extent that price-level stickiness
enables monetary policy to exert leverage over
the path of real interest rates, both current and
expected interest rate policy actions determine
current aggregate demand. 
By solving the inflation-generating function
forward, one can see that the current inflation
rate depends inversely on the path of expected
future markups. The model implies that inflation
will remain low and stable if monetary policy
manages aggregate demand to stabilize the out-
put gap to keep the average markup at the profit-
maximizing markup. In other words, monetary
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expected future markups at the profit-maximizing
markup so firms do not wish to change prices.
Monetary policy that stabilizes the markup at its
profit-maximizing value makes the macroeconomy
behave like the underlying core real business cycle
model with flexible prices. From this perspective,
“flexible price real business cycle models of aggre-
gate fluctuations are of practical interest, not as
descriptions of what aggregate fluctuations should
be like regardless of the monetary policy regime,
but as descriptions of what they would be like
under an optimal monetary policy regime.”19
Looking back at Tobin’s summary of consensus
thinking about monetary policy in 1980, much
remains from that time. There is the idea that
prices are marked up over costs; that price trends
depend on expectations and on tightness of labor
and product markets; that variations in aggregate
demand alter inflation by influencing the tight-
ness of markets; that there is a natural rate of
unemployment (where output equals potential)
at which wage and price setters perpetuate the
going rate of inflation (presumably at the profit-
maximizing markup); that inflation accelerates
when output is expected to exceed potential (the
markup is expected to be compressed); and that
inflation decelerates when output is expected to
fall short of potential (the markup is expected to
be elevated). The main advances since then are
due to (i) the proven power of monetary policy to
reduce and stabilize inflation and inflation expec-
tations at a low rate and (ii) the progress in mod-
eling expectations rationally to understand how
monetary policy consistently committed to stabi-
lizing inflation can achieve favorable results.
The model of monetary policy is closed with
a description of how policy is imagined to be
conducted. Rational expectations teaches that it
is not possible to tell how a monetary policy action
influences behavior unless it is modeled as part
of systematic policy. Hence, the model cannot be
employed to analyze policy actions without speci-
fying how policy is conducted. There are two ways
to do this. One can assume that the central bank
employs a rule for its policy instrument, such as
a Taylor interest rate rule or a McCallum monetary
base rule. Or one can assume that the central bank
chooses its instrument each period to maximize
a welfare function, which could be derived to
reflect household utility in the model. Each way
of closing the model has advantages and disad-
vantages. An ad hoc policy rule can be chosen to
approximate a central bank’s reaction function
in practice. The problem is that an ad hoc rule is
unlikely to be optimal in the model in question.
On the other hand, optimal policy in the model
may not give rise to a policy rule that a central
bank would follow in practice, and it may not be
optimal at all if the model is incorrect.20 Kydland
and Prescott (1977) first pointed out that optimal
monetary policy is likely to be time inconsistent
and that monetary policy may be suboptimal if a
central bank cannot commit to a policy rule.21
4.2 Implicit Inflation Targeting
With respect to the practice of monetary
policy, the most important development since
October 1979 has been the rise of implicit infla-
tion targeting as the core of the Fed’s strategy of
monetary policy.22 This is remarkable in retro-
spect because no one would have predicted it in
October 1979. For instance, although monetarists
insisted that price stability ought to be the primary
goal of monetary policy, their reading of monetary
history suggested that the inflation rate itself
could not serve as a practical guide for monetary
policy and an operational criterion for perform-
ance because of the long and variable lags of nearly
two years in the effect of monetary policy on
inflation.23 Hence, monetarists recommended
monetary targeting as the means by which a
central bank should control the inflation rate. 
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19 Woodford (2003, p. 410). Goodfriend and King (1997) and
Goodfriend (2004) emphasize this point.
20 See McCallum (1999) and Svensson (1999).
21 See, also, Barro and Gordon (1983).
22 The Fed does not have a formal inflation target. But Goodfriend
(2003b) argues that monetary policy conducted by the Greenspan
Fed may be characterized as a form of implicit inflation targeting.
See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) for a formal definition of inflation
targeting.
23 See Friedman (1960, pp. 87-88).The rise of implicit inflation targeting is the
result of a number of factors.24 Most important,
the Fed has shown that a consistent commitment
to price stability can stabilize inflation within a
relatively narrow range at a low rate over the
business cycle. Second, the unemployment cost
(associated with go-stop policy and inflation
scares) of failing to make low and stable inflation
a priority is now well understood. Third, anchor-
ing inflation expectations is understood to pro-
duce three critical benefits: (i) It helps the Fed to
know how its nominal federal funds rate target
changes translate into real interest rate move-
ments, which helps the Fed gauge the likely
impact of its policy actions on the economy; (ii)
it enables the Fed to buy time to recognize and
counteract threats to price stability before they
develop into inflation or deflation scares; and (iii)
it enhances the flexibility of interest rate policy
to react aggressively (without an inflation scare
in bond markets) to shocks that threaten to desta-
bilize financial markets and/or create unemploy-
ment. Fourth, macroeconomic performance since
the Volcker disinflation has produced two of the
longest expansions in U.S. economic history, with
two of the shortest contractions in 1990-91 and
2001. 
4.3 Explicit Interest Rate Policy
A second practical development of consider-
able importance since October 1979 has been the
Fed’s decision since February 1994 to announce
publicly its federal funds rate target immediately
after each FOMC meeting. This development
marked the return to an explicit interest rate pol-
icy, last fully acknowledged in the early 1920s.
When the Fed embarked on its first campaign to
tighten monetary policy in the aftermath of World
War I, it did so with widely publicized increases
in its discount rate, which the public then under-
stood to anchor money market rates in much the
same way the Bank of England’s “bank rate”
had anchored rates since the 19th century.25 High
interest rates were suspected to have caused the
deflation and recession of 1920-21. According to
Meltzer’s (2003) account, it is no exaggeration to
say that the Fed was traumatized by its first use
of open interest rate policy.26 Shortly after that
experience, the Fed moved to adopt operating
procedures to pursue interest rate policy less
visibly. It did so by targeting borrowed reserves. 
Borrowed-reserve targeting enabled the Fed
to talk about monetary policy in terms of the
“degree of pressure on reserves,” rather than in
terms of interest rates, and to create the illusion
that money market rates were determined largely
if not completely by market forces. There were
three reasons for this.27 Money market rates
floated relative to the discount rate, with a
spread that fluctuated with credit risk and the
volume of bank reserves that the Fed forced the
banking system to borrow from Reserve Banks.
Money market rates could be manipulated quietly,
without changing the high-profile discount rate,
by forcing the banking system to borrow more or
less of its reserves at the discount window. The
Fed could create the impression that visible (dis-
count rate) interest rate policy followed market
rates. For instance, if the Fed wanted to raise rates
it could first force banks into the window by
selling securities. That would raise market rates
without raising the discount rate. Later, the Fed
could raise and realign the discount rate while
buying securities to bring the volume of forced
borrowings back down. Of course, the Fed
retained the option of leading with discount rate
changes when it wanted to grab the headlines. 
Thus, borrowed-reserve targeting was noisy
interest rate policy in which the Fed continued
to manage short-term interest rates closely but in
a relatively invisible way. It afforded the Fed a
means of implementing interest rate policy actions
quietly or loudly, depending on what was called
for.28 With some notable exceptions, such as the
1974-79 period, until 1994 the Fed often managed
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24 Feldstein (1997) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2002), for instance,
provide quantitative support for making low inflation a priority.
25 See Hawtrey (1938).
26 See Meltzer (2003, pp. 13, 112-16, and 127).
27 See Goodfriend (2003a).
28 Goodfriend (1991, p. 21) quotes Governor Strong from 1927 and
Chairman Greenspan from 1989, explaining why it is useful for
the Fed to have the option to take policy actions quietly or loudly.short-term interest rates by targeting borrowed
reserves.29
A number of factors account for the Fed’s
decision to return to explicit interest rate policy
in 1994. The period of high interest rates in the
1970s and 1980s, especially during the Volcker
disinflation, gave the Fed a high profile, which it
never lost. Greater public scrutiny of monetary
policy created pressure for increased transparency
of interest rate policy actions. Second, increased
instability in the demand for M1 and M2 in the
1980s and early 1990s undermined the case for
operating procedures that involved bank reserves
and monetary targeting. Third, academic papers
(e.g., Goodfriend, 1991, 1993, and Taylor, 1993)
began to talk about monetary policy explicitly in
terms of interest rates. Fourth, academics learned
how to analyze monetary policy in models with-
out money (e.g., Kerr and King, 1996, McCallum,
2001, and Woodford, 2003) and economists at
the Board developed models of monetary policy
without money (e.g., Brayton et al., 1997). Fifth,
with inflation low and stable, the federal funds rate
could be expected to move in a relatively low and
narrow range. In short, the consensus to imple-
ment, discuss, and analyze monetary policy as
explicit interest rate policy became overwhelming.
4.4 Communicating Policy Concerns
and Intentions
A third practical development of importance
since October 1979 has been the remarkable
increase in transparency in communicating the
concerns and intentions of monetary policy in
addition to announcing the federal funds rate
target. One can understand this transition as a
change in the means by which a central bank
achieves its primary monetary policy mission: to
contribute to macroeconomic stability in a way
that leaves maximum freedom of action to private
markets. The idea is that monetary policy should
be conducted as unobtrusively as possible to mini-
mize interference in markets. Hence, central banks
developed a reputation for secrecy.30 Recent the-
ory and practice reviewed above, however, teaches
that a central bank enhances the performance of
markets by creating an environment of dependable
low inflation. Since transparency creates under-
standing of the tactics and strategy of monetary
policy, transparency rather than secrecy is more
apt to strengthen credibility for low inflation.
Broadly speaking, that is what accounts for the
striking increase in communication with the
public that has characterized monetary policy in
recent years.31
The return to fully explicit interest rate policy
in 1994 initiated greater use of communications
in support of monetary policy actions. The
enhanced visibility of interest rate policy actions
increased the public’s appetite for transparency
and encouraged even more Fed communication
with markets. The train of events worked like
this: Announcing the federal funds rate targets
enabled the federal funds rate futures market to
mature. That, in turn, made the path of expected
future interest rate policy actions more visible to
the public. Market participants and the public
began to debate Fed concerns and intentions for
future interest rates more openly. By measuring
the distance between market expectations and
its internal intentions for the future funds rate,
the Fed could judge the effectiveness of its com-
munications about monetary policy and how they
might be adjusted to achieve a desired effect. The
“conversation” between markets and the Fed
became particularly important in 2003, when
the federal funds rate was 1 percent and the Fed
wished to lower the yield curve to fight the defla-
tion risk by steering expected future interest rates
lower with language that signaled its intention
to be patient in raising interest rates.
Interestingly enough, these developments
appear to have re-created the option for the Fed
to make interest rate policy actions quietly or
loudly. To move interest rates quietly, the Fed
moves federal funds rate futures in the desired
direction by gradually signaling its intentions
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29 Cook and Hahn (1989) point out that the Fed chose to control the
federal funds rate so firmly from September 1974 until September
1979 that the public was able to perceive most changes in the target
on the day they occurred. The extent to which the Fed employed
borrowed reserve targeting from 1979 to 1994 is controversial.
See Cook (1989) and Poole (1982) on the 1979-82 period, and
Thornton (2004) on the period after 1982-84.
30 Goodfriend (1986).
31 See Blinder (2004) and Ferguson (2002).through its communications. Later, the Fed simply
confirms expectations that it created previously
by adjusting its federal funds rate target as
expected. On the other hand, if circumstances are
such that the Fed wishes to get more attention for
its actions, it can surprise markets with federal
funds rate policy actions not prepared for in
advance. In this way, the Fed can appear either
to follow or to lead the market, as it could do with
the borrowed-reserve targeting procedures used
earlier in its history.
5 CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
There are many controversies within the
broad consensus described above—on the theory
of monetary policy, inflation targeting, interest
rate policy, and communications—that matter
for the conduct of monetary policy. Some of these
are discussed below.
5.1 Specification and Interpretation of
the Monetary Policy Model
The most important controversies in the theory
of monetary policy involve the aggregate supply
function (price-setting function), because it
determines the nature of the short-run trade-off
between inflation and unemployment.32 Clearly,
shocks to aggregate demand present no conflict
between stabilizing inflation around its objective
and stabilizing output around potential. What
about shocks to aggregate supply? To appreciate
the issues, consider first the baseline price-setting
function discussed above derived from Calvo
(1983), in which current inflation depends posi-
tively on expected future inflation and inversely
on the current output gap or the current markup.
Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001), King and
Wolman (1999), and Goodfriend (2002) emphasize
that in this baseline case, fully credible price sta-
bility keeps output at its potential and employ-
ment at its natural rate. In other words, there is
no short-run trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment, even for shocks to aggregate supply.33
From this perspective, even those who care mainly
about output and employment can support strict
price stability. 
Yet, many would say that the baseline case is
not realistic and, indeed, taking other potential
features of the macroeconomy into account can
overturn the strong implication that price stabil-
ity is always welfare-maximizing monetary pol-
icy. For instance, John Taylor has emphasized a
trade-off in the long-run variance of inflation and
output relative to potential in models of monetary
policy that results from a short-run trade-off in
the levels of inflation and unemployment. See,
for instance, the papers in Taylor (1999a). Any of
the following modifications of the Calvo price-
setting function produce a short-run trade-off in
inflation and unemployment, adding (i) a “cost”
shock that feeds directly into inflation irrespective
of expectations or the current markup, (ii) lagged
inflation that reflects structural inflation inertia
in the price-setting process, and (iii) nominal wage
stickiness to the baseline model, which otherwise
presumes that wages are perfectly flexible.
With any of these modifications, it is no longer
always possible to stabilize both inflation and
output at potential. Monetary policy must create
a shortfall of aggregate demand relative to poten-
tial output to offset the effect of a cost shock or
inertial inflation on current inflation. Nominal
wage stickiness creates a trade-off with respect to
productivity shocks even without modifications
(i) and (ii). To see this, first consider a temporary
negative shock to productivity in the baseline
model. In that case, markup and inflation stabi-
lization both call for a contraction in aggregate
demand to conform to the contraction in potential
output. And nominal and real wages both fall with
productivity, offsetting the effect of the negative
shock to productivity on marginal cost and the
markup. Thus, when wages are flexible, monetary
policy can simultaneously stabilize the output
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32 The aggregate supply function derived from Calvo (1983) has a
small long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation
that is ignored in practical applications.
33 Fully credible price stability means that current inflation and
expected future inflation are identical (and consistent with a low-
inflation target). In this case, the Calvo price-setting function
implies that actual output equals potential output or, equivalently
in the baseline model, that the actual markup equals the profit-
maximizing markup.gap and inflation. Things don’t work out as neatly
if nominal wages are sticky.34 Then, monetary
policy must steer aggregate demand below poten-
tial (to raise the marginal physical product of
labor) to offset the effect of negative productivity
growth on marginal cost in order to stabilize the
markup and the inflation rate.
Although these modifications seem realistic,
there are reasons to question their importance in
practice. First, because marginal cost is already
taken into account in the underlying theory,
strictly speaking there is no role for a “cost”
shock in the price-setting function. The statisti-
cal residual found in practice might just reflect
measurement error or noise in the modeling of
expectations. If one argues that some costs flow
directly to prices in a perfectly competitive sector,
then theory suggests that the central bank should
consider stabilizing only a “core” index of monop-
olistically competitive sticky prices. Second,
theory that justifies structural inertia in the
inflation-generating process is controversial.35 Lags
of inflation in an estimated inflation-generating
function could reflect persistence introduced
into the inflation rate by central bank behavior,
especially in the presence of measurement or
other specification errors. There is evidence that
apparent inflation persistence is reduced when
inflation is low and stable.36 Third, an inflation
target of 1 to 2 percent coupled with productivity
growth of around 2 percent produces nominal
wage growth in the 3 to 4 percent range. Such
high average nominal wage growth should keep
the economy away from situations in which sig-
nificant downward nominal wage stickiness, as
opposed to slower nominal wage growth, is
required to keep price inflation stable and output
at potential. 
5.2 Should the Fed Adopt an Inflation
Target?
Given the Fed’s established commitment to
low inflation, and the widely agreed-upon benefits
derived from putting a priority on price stability,
the question is this: Should the Fed adopt an
explicit, numerical target range for inflation and
strive to keep inflation in or near that range? This
debate is well illustrated by an exchange between
Goodfriend (2003b) and Kohn (2005). Goodfriend
argues that the Greenspan Fed has been targeting
inflation implicitly in the following senses. First,
Chairman Greenspan testified in 1989 in favor of
a qualitative low-inflation objective for the Fed,
defined as a situation in which “the expected rate
of change of the general level of prices ceases to
be a factor in individual and business decision-
making.”37 Thus, it is reasonable to think that the
Greenspan Fed sought to make that definition of
price stability a reality over time. Second, the
Greenspan Fed targeted inflation flexibly. It
achieved price stability gradually by leaning
against rising inflation in the late 1980s, bringing
it down gradually in the early 1990s, holding the
line on inflation in 1994, and keeping a measure
of inflation favored by the Fed, core PCE inflation,
in the 1 to 2 percent range thereafter. Third, it is
difficult to imagine that, henceforth, the Greenspan
Fed deliberately would target core PCE inflation
above 2 percent or below 1 percent. Fourth, the
Greenspan Fed has implicitly practiced inflation
targeting as constrained countercyclical stabiliza-
tion policy: The Greenspan Fed exploited its
credibility for low inflation to lower short-term
interest rates aggressively to fight the recession
in 2001 and to keep short-term interest rates at
historic lows since then to stimulate employment
and guard against deflation. Thus, Goodfriend
argues that to help perpetuate its current practice
of flexible inflation targeting as constrained sta-
bilization policy, the Fed should acknowledge
an explicit 1 to 2 percent long-run target range
for core PCE inflation.
Contrary to Goodfriend, Kohn (2005) argues
that the Fed would not have been able to adapt
as flexibly to the changing conditions described
above if an explicit inflation target had already
been in place. So Kohn would not characterize
policy pursued by the Greenspan Fed as implicit
inflation targeting. Moreover, Kohn argues that
34 See Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).
35 See Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
36 See Cecchetti (1995) and Cogley and Sargent (2001).
Goodfriend
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL, PART 2 2005 255
37 Greenspan (1990, p. 6).even without explicit inflation targeting the
economy has enjoyed most of the benefits of low
and stable inflation and inflation expectations. He
sees little need to adopt a formal inflation target
to help perpetuate the focus on price stability in
the future. In effect, Kohn thinks that a formal
inflation target would exert a needless constraint
on countercyclical stabilization policy, in part
because he worries that it might be imposed with
more unproductive conditions than Goodfriend
thinks would be the case.
In return, Goodfriend emphasizes three points.
In the long run there are no circumstances in
which sustained inflation should or need be much
higher or lower than today. Monetary policy best
encourages employment and economic growth in
the long run by stabilizing inflation and inflation
expectations. A central bank has an obligation to
inform Congress formally of these lessons learned
from theory and experience of monetary policy
since October 1979 and to ask to be held account-
able for keeping inflation in or near a 1 to 2 per-
cent target range over time in order to improve
congressional oversight of monetary policy.
5.3 Interest Rate Policy with No Role
for Money
It is ironic that monetarists deserve much of
the credit for laying the groundwork for the Fed’s
defeat of inflation, yet the Fed currently ignores
money in both the implementation and analysis
of monetary policy.38 Moreover, monetarists have
long emphasized the dangers inherent in imple-
menting monetary policy using the federal funds
rate instead of using bank reserves or the mone-
tary base as the policy instrument.39 Yet, the Fed
has pursued an explicit interest rate policy since
1994. It is worth recalling, then, the nature of the
monetarist concerns and to consider more gener-
ally the robustness of interest rate policy without
any role for money.
Poole (1978) presents the classic monetarist
criticism of monetary policy: The Fed has tended
to smooth short-term interest rates excessively
over the business cycle in the following sense.40
The Fed has been reluctant to raise short-term
interest rates promptly and aggressively enough
when the economy strengthens after a recession
trough; and the Fed has not lowered rates promptly
and aggressively enough when the economy
weakens at the start of a recession. Hence, interest
rate policy has imparted an excessively procyclical
bias to money growth that has exacerbated the
business cycle. Poole points out that, in the past,
the smoothing of short-term interest rates has
actually caused both short- and long-term rates
to become more volatile over time. Although
Poole doesn’t mention it, interest rate smoothing
probably played a large part in creating the
increasingly inflationary and excessively volatile
go-stop cycles before October 1979.
The Fed has learned to adjust interest rates
more preemptively since October 1979. It moved
interest rates aggressively during the Volcker
disinflation, and inflationary go-stop policy cycles
are no more. A closer look, however, indicates
that some residual problems associated with
interest rate smoothing in Poole’s sense may
remain. For instance, the Fed did not respond
with higher short-term interest rates during the
1987 inflation scare—and may have held rates
too low for too long after the October 1987 stock
market crash, given the increase in inflation that
followed. On the other hand, the Fed did move
aggressively and preemptively to head off rising
inflation in 1994, without creating a recession.
Later in the decade, though, the Fed may have
exacerbated cyclical instability by holding the
federal funds rate target too low for too long.41
Only time will tell whether the monetarist
argument that interest rate policy is inherently
destabilizing will reassert itself. Before leaving
this point, however, it must be mentioned that
Woodford (2003) has shown that “inertial” interest
rate policy may be advantageous. Specifically, if
interest rate smoothing is measured by the coeffi-
cient on R(t –1) in a rule for R(t), the federal funds
rate, then Woodford argues that coefficients above
1 (superinertial interest rate rules) may be optimal.
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38 See Brayton et al. (1997).
39 McCallum (2000b) presents evidence that monetary base rules
performed better over 1970-98 than Taylor-style interest rate rules.
40 Poole (1978, p. 105-10).
41 See Goodfriend (2002).Of course, this requires that the rule also respond
vigorously to inflation or expected future inflation
and possibly to the output gap.
Whatever one thinks about interest rate policy,
there are good reasons why money ought to be
integrated into the Fed’s operating procedures to
some extent. First, the Fed should have a contin-
gency plan to implement “quantitative” policy
by expanding its balance sheet in case the zero
bound becomes a constraint on interest rate policy.
Second, the Fed should have a contingency plan
for returning to monetary targeting in the event
that high and volatile inflation and inflation
expectations cause trouble again. Third, the Fed
needs to understand better how interest rate policy
should be modified to counteract shocks to the
production and use of broad money in the pres-
ence of extreme asset price movements or crises
of confidence in credit markets.42
A final, crucial concern about interest rate
policy is this: Explicit interest rate policy as con-
ducted by the Fed today relies heavily for its
effectiveness on the credibility of the Fed’s com-
mitment to price stability.43 There has been no
explicit nominal anchor for U.S. monetary policy
at least since the United States left the gold stan-
dard when the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate
system collapsed in 1973.44 Six years of monetary
chaos after that persuaded the Volcker Fed in
October 1979 to work toward establishing an
implicit nominal anchor by restoring and main-
taining credibility for low inflation. Monetary
economists have taught, and central bankers have
commonly believed, that monetary policy ought
to have an explicit nominal anchor such as a
link to gold, a fixed foreign exchange rate, an
announced path for a monetary aggregate, or an
inflation target.45 Yet Congress has not designated
one and the Fed has not adopted an explicit nom-
inal anchor to replace the link to gold. Practical
and theoretical developments since October 1979
suggest that monetary policy may not need an
explicit nominal anchor after all, at least in some
circumstances. It is debatable, however, whether
Fed credibility for low inflation alone will prove
to be a robust substitute for an explicit nominal
anchor in the face of the monetary policy chal-
lenges to come, especially since the Fed’s com-
mitment to low inflation needs the support of
conforming fiscal policy to be fully credible.
5.4 Clarifying Short-Run
Communications
Because the Fed does not publicly and
explicitly specify a target range for inflation, it
must signal its short-run concerns and intentions
about inflation and deflation entirely in post-
FOMC meeting statements and minutes and in
the Chairman’s speeches and reports to Congress.
Problems that the Fed experienced in 2003 in
signaling its concern about deflation raise ques-
tions as to whether statements and speeches
substitute adequately for an explicit inflation
target. For instance, the statement following the
May 2003 FOMC meeting, that further disinfla-
tion was unwelcome, came as a surprise, and
media commentary amplified the nervousness
about deflation well beyond what was justified.
Expected future funds rates fell sharply and
pulled longer-term interest rates down sharply
as well. The Fed reduced the federal funds rate
less than the widely expected 50 basis points at
the June meeting, and longer-term interest rates
promptly reversed field. 
Broaddus and Goodfriend (2004) point out
that if an inflation target range had been in place
in 2003, the public could have inferred the Fed’s
growing concern about disinflation gradually as
the inflation rate drifted down earlier in the year.
Expected future interest rates likely would have
come down smoothly with less chance of over-
shooting the Fed’s intended policy stance. The
authors went on to assert that this experience
illustrates a more general point. Rational expec-
tations reasoning teaches that the public has dif-
ficulty gauging the intent of a Fed policy action
taken out of context and, therefore, the Fed will
find it particularly difficult to predict the effect
of an ad hoc unsystematic policy action. Since the
announcement that any more disinflation would
be unwelcome was ad hoc by definition, it is not
42 See Goodfriend (forthcoming).
43 See Blinder (2000).
44 The gold standard ceased to provide an effective nominal anchor
for monetary policy long before that. See Goodfriend (1988).
45 See McCallum (2000a).
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the reaction was excessive, but in another situa-
tion there might have been an insufficient reaction.
The point is that the scope for misunderstanding
in discretionary communications is great.46 On
this basis, a case can be made that an inflation
target would be a valuable addition to the Fed’s
short-run communications procedures. From this
perspective, Broaddus and Goodfriend argue, the
Fed has authority from Congress to set an inflation
target as part of its operational independence.
In the second half of 2003, the Fed had diffi-
culty convincing financial markets of its inclina-
tion to maintain a low federal funds rate for a
“considerable period.” One possible reason, also
argued by Broaddus and Goodfriend, is that policy
statements emphasized strong real economic
growth during the period but paid insufficient
attention to the sizable gap in employment and
to the cumulative deflation in unit labor costs that
had almost certainly widened the gap between
actual and profit-maximizing markups. The
apparent size of these gaps likely helped to pro-
duce the disinflation that occurred in 2003 and
contributed to the deflation risk that inclined the
Fed to keep the federal funds rate low. Broaddus
and Goodfriend argue that the Fed ought to clarify
its short-run concerns and intentions by referring
to gaps in markups, employment, and output more
prominently in its communications in order to
make expected future federal funds rates conform
more closely to the Fed’s preemptive policy inten-
tions. Talking in terms of gap indicators is con-
troversial because of the unfortunate experience
in the 1960s and 1970s, when calling attention
to employment and output gaps created pressure
that led to inflationary monetary policy and poor
macroeconomic performance. Nevertheless,
Broaddus and Goodfriend argue that times have
changed and the Fed could deal with such pres-
sures by announcing an explicit inflation target.
6 CONCLUSION
Monetary theory and policy have been revo-
lutionized in the two decades since the Federal
Reserve moved in October 1979 to stabilize infla-
tion and bring it down. It is true that much of
today’s core theory and practice was already in
place by October 1979. For instance, the sticki-
ness of prices was understood to be important,
current inflation was understood to depend on
expected inflation, and inflation was understood
to respond inversely to the output gap. But the
advances were revolutionary nevertheless. On the
side of practice, the decisive and revolutionary
factor was the demonstration that monetary policy
has the power to acquire and maintain credibility
for low inflation so as to improve the stability of
both inflation and output relative to potential.
On the theory side, the introduction of rational
expectations was decisive because it enabled
models of monetary policy to incorporate forward-
looking elements of aggregate demand and price
setting, long known to be critically important for
policy analysis, so as to understand how mone-
tary policy consistently committed to stabilizing
inflation could achieve the favorable results
found in practice. In short, the period since
October 1979 was a remarkable one in which
major parallel developments in both theory and
experience reinforced each other, making mone-
tary economists and central bankers both more
confident of their respective advances.
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